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2Abstract
Cofoundresses of the desert fungus garden ant Acromyrmex versicolor exhibit a
forager specialist who subsumes all foraging risk prior to first worker
eclosion ( Rissing et al. 1989). In an experiment designed to mimic a "cheater"
who refuses foraging assignment when her lot, cofoundresses delayed/failed to
replace their forager, often leading to demise of their garden ( Rissing et al.
1996). The cheater on task assignment is harmed, but so too is the punisher,
as all will die without a healthy garden.  In this paper we study through
simulation the cofoundress interaction with haploid, asexual genotypes which
either replace a cheater or not (punishment), under both foundress viscosity
(likely for A. versicolor) and random assortment.  We find replacement
superior to punishment only when there is no foraging risk and cheating is not
costly to group survival.  Generally, punishment is evolutionarily superior,
especially as forager risk increases, under both forms of dispersal.
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3Summary.  Cofoundresses of the desert fungus garden ant Acromyrmex versicolor
exhibit a forager specialist who subsumes all foraging risk prior to first
worker eclosion ( Rissing et al. 1989); laboratory observation suggests a
"coordination" mechanism assigning task-specific risk without contention among
(unrelated) cofoundresses ( Rissing et al. 1996).  In an experiment designed to
mimic a "cheater" who refuses foraging assignment when her lot, cofoundresses
delayed/failed to replace their forager, often leading to demise of their
garden ( Rissing et al. 1996).  Such behavior is compatible with game-
theoretic, personally disadvantageous punishment, where the cheater on task
assignment is harmed, but so too is the punisher, as all will die without a
healthy garden.  Here we simulate cofoundress interaction with haploid,
asexual genotypes which either replace a cheater or not (punishment), under
both foundress viscosity (likely for A. versicolor) and random assortment.  We
find replacement superior to punishment only when there is no foraging risk
and cheating is not costly to group survival.  Generally, punishment is
evolutionarily superior, especially as forager risk increases, under both
forms of dispersal.  In many cases coordination may be lost, but only
probablistically over 500,000 years; when so, coordination is usually more
stable under viscosity than random assortment.  Allowing backmutation from
cheaters to coordinators, coordination may recover high frequency after loss.
 Evolutionary stability appears as a cycle of population states:  coordination
is lost to one type of cheater, but this cheater is in turn invaded by another
which, in turn, can be re-invaded by the punishing coordinator; mutation is
governed by a "heuristic" which defines admissible mutants based on present
types ( Dawkins 1980).  A more detailed summary of results is provided below. 
Overall, A. versicolor natural history suggests conditions supportive of
coordination with personally disadvantageous punishment as revealed by
simulation, but not uniquely so.  Our model of A. versicolor enhances the
persistence of punishment within cycles of population states of strategies,
4but it is not necessary.  If, however, stability is seen as a probablistic
measure, our simulations predict coordination (and punishment) will be most
observable under conditions suggested by A. versicolor.
5Introduction
Cooperation among non-relatives rests on the credible threat to withdraw
cooperation in response to similar withdrawal by others.  If, by credible
threat, one means a response which is personally advantageous under
encountered non-cooperation, our thesis is that this transparent statement
need not be true, and that it is natural history that tells us so.  Rather,
evolutionarily viable cooperation can rest on the  strategic decision to
refrain from a personally best response to the non-cooperation of others.  By
making the best of a bad lot one can enhance the frequency of such events (bad
lots) among strategy clones (those genetically encoded with the same strategy,
even if not direct descendants) in the future, leading to the elimination of
all cooperative behavior within the population.
Our model is derived from field and laboratory observations of
cofounding queens of the obligate fungus-garden ant Acromyrmex versicolor
( Higgins 1988; Rissing et al., 1989, 1996).  Unlike most independently
founding ant species, A. versicolor queens (or " foundresses") must tend fungus
(taken at dispersal from their parental colony) by foraging for leaf substrate
prior to the emergence of workers.  Foundresses of this species often
establish nests together; surprisingly, a single female in such a group
subsumes all foraging risk by uniquely performing this task ( Rissing et al.
1989).  By asking, through laboratory experiment ( Rissing et al. 1996) and
computer simulation (herein), what happens if this female refuses such unique
risk, we reveal an evolutionary dynamic where cooperation is viable precisely
because some personally best responses are avoided--viable cooperation
requires groupmates that refuse the task of others, even though all would
thereby do better.
We begin by reviewing field and laboratory observations of Acromyrmex
6versicolor cofoundresses.  Our computer simulations are closely tailored to
these observations, save for restrictions motivated by computational
simplicity which we detail.  We then examine the game-theoretic structure
suggested by natural history, focusing on three forms of cooperation and two
forms of "defection" or "cheating on cooperation" (after Williams 1966;
Maynard Smith 1964; Axelrod 1981; Dugatkin 1990) where a female refuses to
forage (one form of cooperation and defection are actually different
phenotypes of the same strategy).  One cooperative form employs  a personally
best response when exposed to a "cheater" (replaces her); another accepts
foraging risk when so assigned (detailed shortly), but refuses to replace a
female shirking assigned risk.  While the former is often thought game-
theoretically preferable (after Selten 1975; Farrell and Maskin 1989), the
latter is nonetheless " evolutionarily stable" whenever the former is, but not
conversely.  Rather, the morph avoiding some personally best responses is
evolutionarily stable under a wider range of conditions, as foraging risk
increases or when both cooperative morphs appear within the same population.
We also simulate deviations from A. versicolor natural history (random,
population-wide foundress assortment; mild inter-colony competition) to
explore the range of stable, personally disadvantageous punishment.
Natural history of Acromyrmex versicolor
Mating and dispersal
In the Sonoran valley surrounding Phoenix, Arizona, USA, A. versicolor
sexuals (" alates"; Hölldobler and Wilson 1990) usually fly from their parental
nest after heavy rains in late summer (Wheeler 1917; Rissing et al. 1986;
Higgins 1988).  Alates form small, local mating aggregations ( Higgins 1988;
Rissing et al. 1986), perhaps the product of 6 to 8 nearby adult colonies;
local aggregations sometimes seem to form a "line", somewhat evenly spaced,
fading in the distance ( Rissing, pers. obs.).  Such "mini-swarm" spacing seems
a consequence of the relatively regular spacing of adult colonies contributing
7sexuals.  Adult colonies are territorial, generally located under mature 
dominant Sonoran trees (e.g., Olneya tesota; Gamboa 1974; Rissing et al.
1986), whose leaves they harvest ( Gamboa 1975).  Limited water forces some
distance between large trees; hence adult colonies are similarly spaced and,
under low, viscous ( sensu Hamilton 1964) dispersal, so too are mating
aggregations.  This inference will be crucial for some simulation results.
Immediately after mating female alates (now foundresses) leave the local
aggregation in search of a nesting site.  They do not seem to go far, often
removing their wings near the mating aggregation, surveying their environs by
foot ( Rissing, pers. obs.).  Foundresses prefer to establish nests under the
canopy of the same tree species associated with adult colonies; indeed, they
prefer the canopy edge of these trees, where branches frequently droop to the
ground, permitting easy and relatively safe access to leaves during future
colony development.  Consequently, starting nests are clumped ( Rissing et al.
1986).  Foundresses collected from such single-tree clumped natal nests
exhibit little electrophoretic genetic variation ( Hagen et al. 1988), 
consistent with field observation suggesting low dispersal.
 Since adult colonies are territorial, starting colonies underneath an
"occupied" tree are almost certainly eliminated within the first year ( cf 
Hölldobler 1976, 1981;  Mabelis 1979; Hölldobler and Carlin 1985; Pollock and
Rissing 1989; Pfennig 1995 for examples of the elimination of  nearby weaker
colonies among territorial ants).  Similarly, and crucially for our
simulations, clumped starting nests can expect unavoidable inter-colony
competition for sole possession of a currently "adult-unoccupied" tree.  This
expectation shapes subsequent foundress behavior.
Cofoundress interaction during nest foundation--nest excavation
Acromyrmex versicolor foundresses are facultatively " pleometrotic"
8( Hölldobler and Wilson 1977, 1990; Rissing and Pollock 1988), establishing
nests together cooperatively ( Rissing et al. 1986; cf Higgins 1988).  As
foundresses dig they are often joined by others (" cofoundresses").  There is
no evidence that foundresses select one another (contrast Nonacs 1992; Noë and
Hammerstein 1994) in the field ( Hagen et al. 1988; Higgins 1988; Rissing,
pers. obs.) or in the laboratory ( Rissing et al. 1986, 1989, 1996; Higgins
1988); nor is there any evidence that some are coerced into joining others
( Higgins 1988; Rissing et al. 1986, 1996).
Yet, as nest excavation proceeds, a division of labor emerges which
ultimately places one cofoundress under exclusive risk.  Once sufficient
underground space has been excavated one foundress tends to exclusively remove
soil to the surface ( Higgins 1988; Rissing et al. 1996), her cofoundresses
digging underground.  In another desert ant species with a similar population
structure of pleometrosis, clumped natal nests, and adult territoriality ( cf
Pollock and Rissing 1989; Rissing and Pollock 1989), Messor (Veromessor)
pergandei, cofoundresses in laboratory vertical "ant farm" nests sometimes
produce a "fireman line" during soil excavation, with one female digging at
nest bottom, depositing her soil in the middle of the nest, another taking
this soil then just below the surface, and a last removing it to the surface
( Rissing and Pollock 1986).  When cofoundresses fail in this task coordination
they can be quite inefficient, blocking each other from entry/exit during soil
removal, sometimes removing one another as large pieces of dirt!  Task
coordination among ant workers is common (e.g., Franks et al. 1992; Deneubourg
and Franks 1995; Sendova-Franks and Franks 1995), and there seems no reason to
deny this simple variant to cofoundresses.
Cursory evidence suggests A. versicolor is more adept at producing such
an "surface excavator specialist" than  M. pergandei as, within the
laboratory, the former almost always have one while the latter do not
9(contrast Rissing and Pollock 1986 with Rissing et al. 1996).  The reason may
be in their divergent mating ecologies.  Messor pergandei alates "trickle out"
over 6+ weeks ( Pollock and Rissing 1985) while A. versicolor nests coordinate
their production of alates locally over a few days ( Higgins 1988; Rissing et
al. 1986).  Focused predation should consequently be greater in the latter,
especially among night rodents and lizards, who dig about the surface in
search of foundresses ( Rissing, pers. obs.).  The A. versicolor surface
excavator does not, then, subsume unique risk in her task, but simply plays
her part in efficiently producing a haven beyond the (olfactory) inspection of
predators, where all are likely to die in common.  Yet, days after this
danger, the surface excavator "voluntarily" assumes a most risky task,
exposing herself uniquely to above-ground predation for weeks by foraging for
her cofoundresses.
Cofoundress interaction during nest foundation--foraging
specialization
In most obligate fungus gardening ant species, foundresses initially
rear their fungus on their own body reserves, producing " trophic" eggs
consumed by the fungus (e.g., Mintzer and Vinson 1985; Hölldobler and Wilson
1990; Diehl-Fleig and de Araújo 1996) until the first cohort of workers forage
for leaves.  Acromyrmex versicolor foundresses seem unable to avoid foraging
for their fungus until prior to worker production.  Remarkably, a single
foundresses assumes all pre-worker foraging risk ( Higgins 1988; Rissing et al.
1989); more remarkably, the task is not competitively allocated ( sensu West
Eberhard 1981; Heinze et al. 1994), but, rather, performed by the prior
surface excavator specialist ( Rissing et al. 1996).
In laboratory colonies several days elapse between nest excavation and
foraging.  Yet cofoundresses are never seen to either overtly or " ritually" 
( sensu West Eberhard 1981; Hölldobler and Carlin 1985; Heinze et al. 1994)
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contest or avoid the forager role ( Rissing et al. 1989, 1996).  Nor, as noted,
is the surface excavator role itself the subject of contention; there
predation threat precludes "negotiation".  Nor does kin selection seem
operative, as cofoundresses collected from the field are not related as
measured by available electrophoretic variance ( Hagen et al. 1988) and,
unlike, e.g., Polistine wasp cofoundresses, who are differentially hostile to
non-relatives and/or non-parental nestmates (e.g., Ross and Gamboa 1981; Post
and Jeanne 1982; Klahn and Gamboa 1983), A. versicolor foundresses associate
"randomly" ( Rissing et al. 1986; Hagen 1988; cf  Bartz and Hölldobler 1982; 
Ross and Fletcher 1985; Rissing and Pollock 1986, 1988; Hölldobler and Wilson
1990; Sasaki et al. 1996 for similar tolerance among cofoundresses in other
ant species).  The correlation between surface excavator and later forager
specialization does, however, conform to the game-theoretic definition of a
"coordination mechanism" ( Aumann 1974; Rosenthal 1974; Myerson 1986; Cripps
1991).
Surface excavation as a coordination mechanism
A coordination mechanism uses some arbitrary, public event to assign
tasks or roles differentially among game partners or groupmates ( Aumann 1974;
Rosenthal 1974; see  Pollock 1994; 1995a; 1996 for an evolutionary
exposition).  The event is arbitrary in that task assignment is not a
consequence of individual ability but rather of (correlated) circumstance, so
that initial random task assignment to one individual shifts the expected
assignment of others; the event is public in that the "outcome" of task
assignments are "known" (in the game theoretic sense of inferable; e.g.,
Myerson 1991) to all partners.  A surface excavator specialist meets these
conditions.  If no one deposited soil to the surface digging would be
impossible--there would be no room to maneuver within the nest; the
disappearance of soil indicates someone is a surface excavator.  Those digging
inside the nest "know" this, as does the surface excavator herself; assignment
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is public.  And, as noted earlier, surface assignment is not contested but
rather the outcome of arbitrary position within the nest as all frantically
dig while in common jeopardy, employing spatial task assignments common among
social insect workers.  Once such a mechanism exists it may be employed to
assign tasks of  similar structure (one surface excavator, one forager).
The existence of such a mechanism does not guarantee evolutionary
viability.  Consequent task assignment (forager specialist) must be an
equilibrium, with "strategy morphs" refusing assignment eliminated in
evolutionary time.  An individual foraging when she need not seems trivially
inviable, but what of an assigned forager refusing her task?  In this case an
individual replacing her would perform a personally best response.  But, if
so, an assigned forager may indeed be tempted to shirk her task.  The simplest
solution is to refuse the personally best response when exposed to a shirker,
contrary to the heuristic of individual advantage common in behavioral ecology
(e.g., Dawkins 1976, 1982; Pollock 1994a).  Experimentally, this is the case
( Pollock and Rissing 1995; Rissing et al. 1996).
Experimental evidence for punishment
While unable to force  a cofoundress to refuse her task ("cheat" on
coordination) we can alter the perceptions of her cofoundresses so that she
appears to cheat ( Pollock and Rissing 1995; Rissing et al. 1996; the
individually specific information sets of economic game theory [ Myerson
1991]).  Consider a set of three-queen laboratory natal colonies which have
developed a (uniquely marked) forager specialist.  Divide the colonies into
two treatments.  In one the forager is removed while foraging (she "dies"
while outside the nest)--the controls; in the other, the forager is blocked
when trying to leave the nest, but her cofoundresses are not--the
experimentals.  Details may be found in Rissing et al. (1996).  In the
controls remaining cofoundresses experience an event which occurs in nature
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(forager death) and must replace her.  In the experimentals they perceive an
assigned forager failing to leave the nest even though, upon personal
inspection, exit is unblocked.  The differential response time of non-foragers
(ultimately, replacing the original forager) between treatments is a measure
of game-theoretic reply to potential cheating (deviation from coordination). 
To the extent treatment non-foragers delay replacement of a "cheater" beyond
the time it takes to replace a lost forager, they punish ( sensu Axelrod 1980;
Radner 1980; Boyd and Richerson 1992; and below) the cheater by suppressing
potential colony fitness; but, as resources are held in common (see below),
punishers hurt themselves as well.
Call an original non-forager a replacement when she appears near the
nest entrance, whether or not she exits to the surface.  We say a replacement
forages when she actually leaves the nest to inspect a small attached foraging
arena.  Table 1 summarizes (original) nonforager response by treatment across
4 variables.  While all control colonies exhibited a foraging replacement (on
average after 10 days), some experimentals failed to do so for 29 days,  when
the experiment was terminated.  The fungus garden died in a majority of the
latter (7 of 10; Rissing et al. 1996); these colonies would have no chance of
survival.  Crucially, the experimentals suffer a seven-fold reduction in
fungus mass and exhibit fewer pre-worker pupae and larvae.  Other laboratory
and comparative evidence suggest such a reduction in colony development would
be disastrous in nature.
Intercolony competition as brood raiding
As noted earlier, adult territoriality in A. versicolor implies that
natal nests clumped under a tree without a prior adult colony must ultimately
engage in intense inter-colony competition for sole possession of the tree. 
Several ant species with such adult territoriality exhibit competition among
natal nests in the form of "brood raiding" in both laboratory ( Bartz and
13
Hölldobler 1982; Rissing and Pollock 1987, 1991; Tschinkel 1992a; Sommer and
Hölldobler 1995) and field ( Tschinkel 1992a,b), with supportive laboratory
evidence for A. versicolor ( Higgins 1988; Rissing et al. 1989; Pollock and
Rissing 1995; see Pollock and Rissing 1989 for further cases).  Once workers
eclose (emerge from pupae), some begin to forage.  When foragers encounter a
"rival" natal nest they rush in, absconding with brood which they take to
their own nest, returning for more ( cf Rissing and Pollock 1987; Tschinkel
1992a).  While workers from competing nests may fight upon encounter, the
attacked nest begins reciprocal "brood raids" on the attacking nest, once
located.
The size of the initial worker force is crucial to brood raiding
success.  In at least three species with brood raiding among clumped natal
nests, those nests with more queens produce more workers ( Rissing and Pollock
1987, 1991; Tschinkel 1992a; Sommer and Hölldobler 1995) and, where measured,
are more likely to win the raiding contest ( Rissing and Pollock 1987, 1991;
Tschinkel 1992a).  Intense intercolony competition among natal nests leading
to adult territoriality seems, then, a likely selective force underlying
pleometrosis ( Rissing and Pollock 1987; Pollock and Rissing 1989; see Pfennig
1995 for another view).  Relative worker number likely affects competitive
success nonlinearly ( Tschinkel 1992a; cf Wilson 1990).
Summary
Our simulations will "idealize" the following field and laboratory
evidence.  Acromyrmex versicolor foundresses disperse locally, with
foundresses from just a few colonies congregating under preferred trees and
forming nests pleometrotically.  Their nests are thus clumped and destined to
undergo intense rivalry upon production of the initial worker force. 
Cofoundresses use a prior "surface-excavator" coordination mechanism to
allocate the risky task of foraging for the common fungus to a single
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foundress.  Game theoretically, a foundresses may accept risky task assignment
when it is her lot, or not; her cofoundresses may replace her, or not.  Colony
fitness (brood raiding potential) is maximal under uncontested coordination
and minimal under common refusal by all to forage (i.e., a queen refuses
assignment and her cofoundresses refuse to replace her); replacing a shirker
should produce some intermediary colony fitness.  Experimentally,
cofoundresses seem to punish shirkers (harming themselves) severely,
undoubtedly handicapping the colony in future brood raids.  We show this
behavior is most stable under simulation when coupled with low foundress
dispersal and strong, nonlinear, intercolony competition, both suggested by
field and laboratory evidence.
Simulation design
We consider a population of 100 adult colonies, each under its own tree,
connected as the circumference of a circle.  Each year ( not colony generation,
as a colony may live many years) each living adult colony produces haploid
asexual foundresses which disperse to the two neighboring trees.  Foundresses
are haploid asexual to avoid  allele dominance or penetrance; the assumption
is common in models of behavioral ecology (e.g., Wilson and Dugatkin 1991;
Taylor 1992a,b).  If the neighboring location has an active adult colony, all
foundresses settling there are destroyed; only when the adult colony has died
is successful colony foundation possible.  Each year, each adult colony dies
with a given probability, independently of its age and independently of its
neighbors, with one proviso:  to insure an unoccupied tree will always be
"seeded" by a new natal colony, three contiguous colonies never die in the
same year, for neighbor dispersal would then leave the middle tree unoccupied;
this proviso is for programming ease and computational speed.  We use an
"independent" adult colony death rate of 5%, giving an expected adult lifetime
of 20 years, a bit on the high side of A. versicolor, but not implausible
( Rissing, per. obi.).
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Each natal colony is established by three cofoundresses. 4  Underneath a
simulation tree-location foundresses sort randomly, without preference for
parental nestmates; kin recognition does not occur.  For computational speed 5
natal colonies are created under a vacant tree, all surviving until the brood
raiding phase.  Each natal colony produces a colony fitness derived from
cofoundress behavior on task assignment; once fitnesses are assigned the brood
raiding winner is a random draw of the five colonies, weighted by their
fitnesses.
We idealize foraging as a single event.  Once a forager, if any, is
assigned, she makes one foraging trip, falling prey to above ground mortality
with some uniform probability per simulation.  If she dies, she nonetheless
manages to return with food before death.  Thus forager death does not affect
colony fitness; only the initial presence or absence of a forager does. 5   In
at least two species of pleometrotic ants with brood raiding, cofoundresses
engage in lethal combat with one another for sole possession of the nest after
cooperative production of the initial "brood raiding force" ( Messor
[Veromessor] pergandei, Rissing and Pollock 1987 and Lasius niger, Sommer and
Hölldobler 1995).  Acromyrmex versicolor does not; rather, cofoundresses
coexist peacefully for several years in the laboratory.  Thus, in simulated
colonies,  only forager mortality and brood wars filter queen reproduction. 
                    
  482.5% of all foundresses collected at one site in one year had a cofoundress, with an average of
7 cofoundresses per pleometrotic colony ( Rissing et al. 1986)  Nonetheless, the modal number of
oundresses per colony was only 2 (16 of 36 pleometrotic colonies); because 2 foundress nests are
ely to lose the brood wars relative to the 55% of pleometrotic nests with 3 or more queens (after
sing  and Pollock 1987, 1991; Tschinkel 1992a), we restrict attention to the simplest n-person
ironment, yet acknowledge our simulations do not in this respect duplicate field evidence.
  5Actually, of course, a forager may die over many trips, her death truncating colony fitness
il replaced.  By ignoring the fine grain of multiple forager trips and, possibly, multiple
lacements after forager deaths, we have a best-case scenario for cheaters on coordination; for
tance, a cheater who is replaced is never subject to forager mortality, as she would if the only
aining foundress after 2 forager deaths.  Apart from the advantage to cheaters  we avoid finer
in because of computation time and the added parameter of average number of foraging trips.
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Adult colonies with multiple queens likely produce no more alates than those
with single queens ( Hölldobler and Wilson 1990); worker number plateaus to
cover the foraging arena centered under their tree, and it is worker, not
queen, number which limits alate production by food availability.  Each adult
colony thus produces the same (assumed large) number of alates, shared
equitably by remaining queens.
Strategies
We restrict strategies to the minimal two stage game permitting a
response to cheating on coordination.  In the first stage only the "assigned
forager" (chosen randomly among the three queens at natal colony foundation)
makes a "strategic decision"--to accept her risky assignment or not.  If she
accepts, the game is over; if not, the game enters the second stage, where her
cofoundresses decide whether or not to replace her.  We consider four
(haploid) strategies:
P "punisher", which accepts original foraging assignment but never
replaces a shirker refusing foraging assignment; motivated by
experimental data.
Q "quiter", which never accepts original assignment nor replaces another
shirking assignment; motivated by the cheater critique (e.g., Williams
1966; Pollock and Rissing 1995).
R " replacer", which accepts original forager assignment and also replaces
another shirking such assignment.  R plays a personally best response
(after, e.g., Selten 1975; West Eberhard 1981; Myles 1988; Farrell and
Maskin 1989) against Q where P would not.
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C a "sophisticated cheater", included to complete  the "strategy space",
which will not accept original forager assignment but will replace
another shirking such assignment.  C is a "cheating variant" on R in the
same sense that Q is a cheating variant on P.
Table 2 categorizes the strategies by the two sequential properties of
accepting assignment and replacing.  Sometimes there will be two replacing
morphs ( RR, RC, or CC) in a group with a shirker on original coordination ( Q
or C); when so, we choose the replacer randomly.
Mutation
We begin with two  mutation regimes, P,R Þ Q and P,R Þ Q,C ( Q Û C),
then expand mutation to include P Û R and, thereafter, allow backmutation
from cheating ( Q,C) to coordination ( P,R).  The first two assume violating
coordination (" noncooperation") dominates mutation events, which seems the
prevalent heuristic in behavioral ecology (e.g., Williams 1966; Dawkins 1976,
1982; cf Pollock 1994b, Pollock and Rissing 1995); the latter two introduce a
mutation heuristic where mutation probabilities depend on present types (from
which mutational variation must arise; Dawkins 1980), motivated by strategy
definitions (detailed below).
Note that, without Q, C can identify itself in game play.  Suppose two
C's in a two-person group, with one designated the forager.  By definition,
this C will not fulfill her task.  Her groupmate C, however, will replace her.
 If strategy C is the only kind of shirker, this latter C "knows" her
assumption of risk aids a strategy clone (the shirking C); no other (non-
trivial) combination of the four strategies and original task assignment
provides such guarantee.  C without Q, then, can enjoy a "green beard effect"
( Dawkins 1976).  We prevent this by always allowing Q as a mutant on C;
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replacing C does not know if it aids a clone or a Q.
Precluding C as a mutant has non-trivial consequences.  We will see that
allowing both types of cheater rather than just Q depresses the range of
stable coordination, not necessarily in favor of C, rather sometimes in favor
of Q; C can create intermediate population states, relative to either P or R,
which are more readily invaded by Q.
Mutations occur immediately after natal colony creation, before
coordinated forager assignment.  Once a "colony genotype" is created by local
random choice of three females from the tree-specific alate pool, each
cofoundresses undergoes a "mutation opportunity" 6 from her present type as
allowed by the simulation specific mutation regime.  Allowed mutations are
usually at the high rate of .001, except P Þ R which is at .0001 for reasons
advocated below.  High rates are employed for clear results; as the highest
rates favor cheaters (not coordinators), we do not think this limiting.
Colony efficiency and failed coordination
Failed coordination entails a depression in colony fitness, the degree
of which we vary.  We standardize perfect coordination as a colony fitness of
1000; this value is obtained by any colony with either R or P the (randomly)
designated forager, regardless of  cofoundress strategy types.  Ideally a QQQ
colony (or, e.g., PPQ with Q the assigned forager; QQC with C the assigned
forager) should have zero fitness, as the colony's fungus must die.  It would
then be possible for all natal colonies under an unoccupied tree to die,
                    
  6Each simulation employs numerous random number calls over as many as 500,000 years, for adult
ths, creation of cofoundress genotypes,  mutation events, forager deaths, and brood war victories.
e random number generator must robustly mimic a uniform distribution in (0,1); we employ "ran2"
ocated in Press et al. (1992:281-282), which should not cycle for at least 2 x 10 18 calls.  The
hors boast (p.281):  "We think that, within the limits of its floating-point precision, ran2
vides perfect random numbers; a practical definition of "perfect" is that we will pay $1000 to the
st reader who convinces us otherwise (by finding a statistical test that ran2 fails in a nontrivial
...)".  We have not tried.
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leaving the tree empty.  For computational simplicity we avoid this, assigning
such a colony a fitness of 1, not zero; after some long delay even a QQQ
colony manages some foraging to avoid pre-brood war death.  Such a small
colony fitness is usually unimportant unless all natal colonies under a tree
have "no forager".
Our results hinge on the reduction in colony fitness born by colonies
with realized replacers (a replacing R or C).  There are two reasons for
believing this reduction relatively great.  First, brood wars likely amplify
fitness as measured by fungus mass or worker number non-linearly; the
reduction is not, e.g., reduced fungus mass, but rather the affect of relative
fungus mass on brood raiding success.  Second, the coordination mechanism, by
employing the unique cofoundresses with most prior above ground exposure (the
surface excavator), "picks" the cofoundress most likely to efficiently orient
herself to the nest during initial foraging exploration.  The effect should
amplify with effort, as social insect workers learn with experience (e.g.,
Schmid-Hempel and Schmid-Hempel 1984; Hölldobler and Wilson 1990; O'Donnell
and Jeanne 1992; Dukas and Visscher 1994; Schatz et al. 1995).  The replacer
of a shirker lacks this initial experience, which should depress her
efficiency (see "mistakes and the evolution of coordination", below).  We
employ two values for reduced fitness, 200 vs 900, supplementing these with
400 and 600 on occasion.
Simulation sets
We address three questions by slight variants on simulation starting
conditions.  First, of P and R, which is relatively superior, regardless of
ultimate evolutionary stability, and under what mutation regimes.  We measure
relative superiority by placing 50 contiguous PPP colonies on the circle, the
rest contiguous RRR, running the simulation until either (a) one but not both
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of P,R has vanished, with the survivor at least 95% of the population
(relative to cheating morphs Q or C,Q) or (b) both P,R are lost and some
cheating morph is at least 95% of the population.  Each simulation can run for
100,000 years (usually < 10,000) and is duplicated 200 times.  A run
terminating at year 100,000 (with neither condition fulfilled) is a "tie" no
matter what the relative frequencies of the strategies, with surviving
strategies listed as "tied"; this happens rarely.  The relative number of P vs
R "wins" across 200 trials provides a measure of the morphs' relative
superiority under "fair starting conditions" for P and R.  We are sampling the
various event pathways favoring one over another strategy; these paths are
non-trivial under viscous dispersal.  To permit clear victory, backmutation to
P,R from Q,C is here precluded; similarly  P Û R mutation.
A P win does not imply evolutionary stability, for P might succumb to Q
or Q,C given sufficient time.  On those occasions when there is a clear winner
across the prior 200 trial sets, we test evolutionary stability by beginning a
simulation with all 100 colonies of this type, running it for 500,000 years,
likely longer that the present duration of the desert habitat in which
pleometrotic A. versicolor is found ( xxrefxx).  A starting morph is
"evolutionarily stable" under a given mutation regime if it does not vanish
after 500,000 years.  Although some " evolutionarily stable" morphs dip as low
as 50% of the population, they are well over 90% overall.  We find that,
without  P Û R mutation, both P,R may be stable; but, conforming to the
relative superiority results, P's range of stability subsumes R's.
We next consider  P Û R mutation.  Under what we think a plausible
mutation heuristic linking the four strategies, R does poorly, occasionally
drifting to saturation but unable to resist re-invasion by P.  The primary
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affect of  P Û R mutation under the heuristic is to shift some populations to
complete uncoordinated first stage game play (e.g., C and/or Q saturate, so
surface excavators never accept task assignment; CCC groups exhibit
coordination, but only in second stage game play, under reduced group
fitness).  Even so, under our 4-strategy mutation heuristic the stability of P
expands, but only probablistically, while R persists solely through a
combination of  P Û R mutation and drift.  100 replicates of 500,000 year run
parameter sets under the heuristic often diverge in "stable morph" outcome;
"evolutionary stability" becomes a probablistic measure of morph persistence
for 500,000 years.
Lastly, we add backmutation from cheaters ( Q,C) to first-stage
coordinators ( P,R).  We find that, even when coordination is lost, P, never R,
may re-invade and saturate, beginning the cycle anew ( R reappearing through
mutation on P).  The emergence of coordination ( P) becomes a secondary result
of our stability simulations ("mistakes and the evolution of coordination"
below also discusses emergence).  Probablistic re-invasion is contingent on
simulation parameters (forager death, replacement fitness); P's evolutionary
persistence can thus be probablistic in two senses (loss and re-emergence). 
There are, however, conditions where first-stage coordination cannot re-
emerge:  when the frequency of C is sufficiently high (relative to Q) after
loss of P,R.
We duplicate many of the parameter sets under "random assortment", where
all living adult colonies contribute alates to a global (free-mixing) pool,
from which 5 natal colonies are produced for each vacant tree.  As expected,
P's evolutionary persistence is significantly worse under random mixing, yet
here too cycles of population-wide coordination loss, re-saturation of P are
possible.  We denote simulations employing, say, 200 replacement fitness, .5
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forager death under viscosity by {200, .5, v}, under random assortment by {200
,.5, r}.
Results
Relative superiority of P,R
1.  Under viscosity, P often out performs R; otherwise they "win"
equally.
Table 3 presents "fair contest " results with the relatively low
replacement fitness (high cost for lost coordination) of 200, for mutation to
Q,C and solely to Q; a foundress should, nonetheless, replace a cheater to
maximize expected personal fitness.  At no value of simulated forager death
does R do better than P. 7  Within the range [.5,.8]  P outperforms R robustly
(except for the "tie" at .5 forager death with Q only mutation, discussed
shortly); with 90% forager death Q predominates.
While an R exposed to a cheating Q does personally better than a P so
exposed, R's personal superiority "incubates" Q offspring for the next
generation; if she survives, so does her cheating colonymate.  Neighboring-
tree alate dispersal places these incubated Q offspring disproportionately
among the offspring of this very R; by surviving, R enhances the frequency of
group (brood war) inefficient cheating environments encountered by her
immediate descendants ( cf Pollock 1989a).  As forager death increases, Q's
supplanting of R quickens, as there are fewer surviving replacement foragers
to dilute the representation of Q in future local alate pools.   A relatively
long-lived spatially specific Q frequency, beyond the background mutation
probability globally experienced by R's "rival" P, is focused on future R's.
                    
  7Over numerous simulations we have noticed reversals in relative P,R wins of, occasionally, up to
0.  Differentials of 30+ seem, however, robust.  We will use the latter as a measure of significant
tory.
23
P, in contrast, sacrifices itself to eliminate encountered cheating Q; 8
under viscous dispersal her neighboring rival natal colonies often consist of
 P as well, as they are derived from the same pool of local alates. 
Sacrificing herself by punishing Q, she aids her strategy clones in nearby
groups ( Pollock 1988), eliminating the offspring of encountered Q from the
social environment of the brood war victor's descendants.  Inspecting the
spatial trajectory of simulations, one sees Q grow in a patch of R until the
latter are eliminated  ([.5,.8] forager death, Table 3); then, encountering P
along the boundary of a now Q patch, the patch is pushed back until eliminated
(see J. B. Wilson 1987; Pollock 1989b for similar processes).  Viscosity now
works against Q for, as it disproportionately encounters itself, it is more
likely to exist in abysmally inefficient social environments (uncoordinated)
with a colony fitness of 1 ( cf Pollock 1989a,b); as in kin selection,
uncooperative Q is eliminated via self-clumping (Wade and Breden 1980).
 But, for sufficiently high forager death, P fails against Q.  Suppose
forager death unavoidable; P can then persist only if foraging (apart from
punishment) aids relatives (clones) in her group (kin selection).  Viscous
dispersal mediated by neighboring trees seems incapable of providing
sufficient intra-group relatedness (probability of clonal encounter) to
preserve P (Tables 3,4; cf Murray and Gerrard 1984; J. B. Wilson 1987; Wilson
et al. 1992; Taylor 1992,a,b for similar limitations on viscosity).  Spatial
proximity is less exclusive to foreign genotypes than a rule insuring common
ancestry by immediate descent.  Kin grouping can actively preclude group
association among different types; viscosity can not.  The latter process
permits, stochastically, more PQQ groups with P the designated forager than
the former; under the extreme case of  asexual haploid inheritance, such
groups cannot occur under sibling assortment except by mutation.  With
                    
  8Of course, a Q not assigned the forager role is phenotypically neutral with respect to similar
this just delays the affect of Q, if it survives chance elimination when rare.
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mandatory forager death these groups occur sufficiently in our model to insure
P's elimination.  Continuity implies similar logic for sufficiently high yet
uncertain forager death, with evolutionary advantage (partly through the
removal of Q's through punishment) shifting to P as forager death decreases.
C facilitation of Q
While C is itself inviable at 200 replacement fitness, P fairs
significantly better against Q when C is precluded (Table 3).  When present, C
wins on only one occasion (with certain forager death); yet P's relative
success over Q is enhanced dramatically at 90% forager death when C is
excluded.  Clumped C's colony fitness is 200 times that of clumped Q, as C
replaces its own phenotypically refusing type while Q does not.  Clumped C
will thus be harder for P to defeat (push back) than clumped Q.  For the same
reason, R patches are even more vulnerable to C than Q.  But, similarly, C is
even more vulnerable to Q than R is to Q (maximally fitness differential
across colonies is 200:1, not 1000:1); inspecting the spatial trajectory of
simulations, R patches become C patches which become Q patches.  P then "eats"
the Q patch, as before.  The cycle repeats, as R persists for some time by
drifting into P patches when phenotypically neutral.
Two factors work against P, often terminating the cycle in a Q win. 
First, C causes the size of Q patches encountered by P to be greater. 
Stochastically, it takes longer, so is more difficult, to eliminate Q. 
Second, C can, again stochastically, create a self-cluster without R by
mutating from P; these clusters can expand by drift which, when themselves
invaded by a mutant Q, continue the cycle without R.  Repeated dips in P's
frequency can ultimately lead to its stochastic elimination in the finite 100
colony population.  As we shall see, in an evolutionary stability run of P
with only C, Q mutants, P persists at overall high frequency for over 450,000
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years, with the (spatially local) cycle P --> C --> Q --> P repeating until
P's stochastic loss ( cf Pollock 1989b for a similar, albeit deterministic
process); without mutation to C, P is robustly high for 500,000 years against
Q under the same parameters ( f P  > .5; f P > .9  92.1%; Table 8, below).
Clumped C as a transition to Q is similar to an intermediate stage of a
game-theoretic " renegotiated equilibrium" ( Farrell and Maskin 1989; van Damme
1989; motivated by Selten 1975).  Once deviation from coordination occurs,
game partners (here, cofoundresses) have no interest in retaining their
previous roles; replacement is personally advantageous (the first phase of
renegotiation).  Yet self-interest leads immediately to a new commons dilemma
( sensu Hardin 1982; Boyd and Richerson 1988; Dugatkin 1990):  if a colonymate
will replace the shirker, let her (the second phase).  C solves this problem
with a new (implicit) coordination mechanism (we allow only one forager) but
is thereby vulnerable to Q.  In our simulation of intergroup competition,
clustered C's "stochastic viability" among P (e.g., 1000:200 colony fitness
ratio) is related directly to C's resistance to Q ( e.g, 200:1 colony fitness
ratio); as C improves against P,R it also improves against Q.
Table 4 duplicates Table 3 with a replacement colony fitness of 900. 
With C,Q mutation, shirking is ubiquitous, with Q replacing C for sufficiently
high forager mortality ( > .8).  We have truncated the game to two stages, so
only Q can shirk replacing a shirker.  But, once C is prevalent, we could
apply the same logic to further reduce colony efficiency ( cf Selten 1978;
Selten and Stoecker 1986; Schuessler 1989; Pollock 1991, 1995; Cressman 1996
for similar processes); C's success at low foraging mortality is more an
artifact of our 2-stage game than a biological prediction.  We will argue
later that "stable" C would likely unravel into more Q-like shirkers, leading,
incrementally, to an all Q population ("Stable C?" below).  Ironically, this
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later population may be re-invaded by P even when the intermediate C
population can not ( cf Pollock 1995 and below).
Under 900 replacement fitness and forager deaths in [.5, .9], P wins
robustly when C is precluded, surpassing its performance with the same range
of forager death under 200 replacement fitness (Tables 3,4).  High replacement
fitness causes R to successfully incubate more Q, accelerating the former's
demise.  P, however, continues to eliminate Q clusters at the same rate as
under 200 replacement fitness, as neither P,Q replace.  P's success thus
hinges less on the (in)efficiency of forager replacement than on the combined
effects of viscosity (clumping types) and the sequential loss of colony
fitness throughout the population via intermediary strategies ( C; cf Pollock
1995).
R predominates ("wins") over P with no forager death and both C,Q
mutation (Table 4); this is the only instance of R predominance under
viscosity.  With positive forager death replacement is weakly altruistic
( sensu Wilson 1979, 1990); a replacer enhances her personal fitness, but her
groupmates gain more.  Viscosity enhances the cost of weak altruism by
assorting the descendants of replacers with the descendants of cheaters. 
Without forager death this cost vanishes even under viscosity; R should always
be superior to P.
But R's advantage must be translated into evolutionary competition. 
Without forager death Q is never a best response; mutant Q's appearing in
either P or R patches are eliminated, so Q can affect P,R success only when
all three strategies appear within the same arena (empty tree).  Under
viscosity such PQR foundress pools are relatively infrequent; noise appears to
mask any advantage for replacement under Q only mutation, with P,R winning
27
equally (Table 4, {900, 0, v}).  C mutants, however, consume P clusters by
forcing replacement opportunities at the C,P cluster boundary via CCP vs CPP
groups; R,C boundaries are neutral ( CCR, CRR are phenotypically identical when
cheating occurs).  At {900, 0, v} the cost of cheating (in CCP groups with
both cheater and replacer C) to induce non-replacement (depressing the fitness
of P in CPP groups) seems sufficiently small to shift population "wins" to R
(Table 4).  With low replacement fitness (200; Table 3) the effect seems lost
in noise, as replacement leads infrequently to placement (brood war victory)
as an adult colony; P,R win "equally".  Once there is a true cost to
replacement (possible forager death), C outperforms R as well at their cluster
boundary (as R replaces more often than C), yielding C wins under moderate
forager death ([.2,.5], 900 replacement fitness; Table 4).
2.  Under random assortment R improves its relative performance to P.
Removing the spatial correlation between the descendants of personally
advantageous replacers and successful cheaters, random offspring dispersal
should enhance (relative) R wins, as is mildly apparent under 200 replacement
fitness at [.8,.9] forager deaths ( Q only mutation; Table 5 vs Table 3).  Some
P wins under viscosity are now distributed to R and Q, reflecting how these
latter strategies harm themselves under viscosity (e.g., P clusters no longer
destroy neighboring Q clusters, as neither exist).  Note that both P,R
sometimes "win" under certain forager death, which is evolutionarily
impossible.  Recall, however, that "fair contest" simulations are designed to
reveal the relative standing of P,R, not predict stability (addressed
shortly).  Our initial population is 50% PPP, RRR groups; random assortment
expands stochastic pathways of selection which can induce "victory" not
necessarily reflecting long term resistance to recurrent cheating.
3.  Random assortment yields unique superiority for R under high
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replacement fitness, with a stable polymorphism of R,Q (or C,Q when C is
allowed) under moderate forager death.
Table 6 duplicates Table 5 with 900 replacement fitness.  The high
viability of colonies with replacers (900 vs 200) enhances the success of
cheating, which in turn, enhances the success of replacement since the fitness
of phenotypic replacers and cheaters is not correlated spatially.   Without C
mutants R outperforms P within the range [0,.5]; at greater forager death
predominance shifts to Q.  The value of cheating increases with forager death;
at {900, .5, r} a clear polymorphism is reached, where neither R nor Q
achieves a 95% frequency for 100,000 years.
C couples the benefits of both R and Q (Table 2); when present, R's
relative performance against P declines (in the range [.1,.2], Table 6), with
C replacing R in polymorphism with Q {900, .5, r} (Table 6).  Random
assortment here conforms to the logic of personally best, situationally
specific, responses (cheat when you can get away with it, but limit costs when
exposed to cheaters; e.g., Selten 1975; West Eberhard 1981; Myles 1988), but
only under low group cost to cheating (Table 5 vs 6).  This is not surprising
since, under high group cost, colony success is so unlikely as to be
undetectable in our finite population.
Evolutionary stability of P,R
4.  Without P Û R mutation, P is always stable when R is, but not
conversely.
Predominate strategy "wins" in the fair contest trials predict
evolutionary stability (survival at mostly +90% of the population for 500,000
years) under the same mutation regime as the contest.  Thus, under
combinations of .2,.8 forager death and 200,900 replacement fitness, viscous
dispersal, P is stable whenever R is, but not conversely (Tables 7,8). 
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Without P Û R mutation, R is stable against both C and Q at .2 forager death
for both replacement values, but not for .8 (Table 7); P is similarly stable
at .2 forager death, but also at .8 against Q under both replacement fitnesses
(Table 8).  With both Q,C mutation, P mostly retains high frequency under
{200, .8, v}, with occasional peaks of C, then Q, back to P for some 455,000
years,  ultimately undergoing stochastic elimination when low (discussed
previously; Table 8).  Envisioning forager mortality as "periodically high", P
is more stable than R, irrespective of high/low replacement fitness.  Yet this
difference is most pronounced when cheaters are restricted to Q.  To clarify
the role of C in P,R relative stability we next introduce a heuristic
structuring mutation by "baseline" pre-mutant type. 
A mutation heuristic on strategy properties
Mutation is a physical process, creating new variants from pre-existing
types (Darwin 1859; Dawkins 1980).  Present types restrict the space of novel
forms and, within this space, mutation probabilities need not be identical;
some errors are more likely than others.  Our "fair contests" assumed that
prior types P,R do not shape their mutational variants; yet, examining these
strategies, this seems unlikely.  Table 2 defines each strategy within a two-
locus "property space":  accepting initial assignment and replacing a shirker
refusing assignment.  We see no reason to link these properties at mutation. 
Single event "double mutation" on properties is then most unlikely, giving
prevalent mutational paths P Û R; P Û Q;  C Û Q; R Û C (Table 2).  Note
that R's most damaging invader, C, is then more likely to come from itself
than from P.  Under viscosity herein, a clumped prior type shapes its own
mutational adversaries, as these mutants are derived from itself, and
generally interact disproportionately with the prior type ( cf Pollock 1989b,
1995).
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The four prevalent mutation pairs are not symmetric in probability. 
Consider, for example, P Þ Q.  P recognizes task assignment and acts upon it;
Q does nothing, so need recognize nothing.  On the assumption that errors
inducing behavioral loss are more likely than errors shaping "constructive"
behavior (e.g., pathways for loss are shorter in code length), P Þ Q seems
more likely than Q Þ P.  At present, we preclude the latter mutation, as we
are concerned with the stability of coordination against eroding cheaters; we
will add mutation to coordination later.  Similarly, C Þ R is excluded for
the moment.  The remaining two mutational pairs ( P Û R; C Û Q) lose/gain
propensity to replace while fixing initial task acceptance.  We assign the
loss pathway probability .001, the gain pathway .0001.  We think the gain
assignment generous but, at present, this is a matter of taste.
Stability under the heuristic
5.  With viscosity and P Û R mutation under the heuristic, P's
resistance to R increases with forager death.
Although our mutation heuristic focuses C invaders on R patches under
viscosity, P Û R drift also occurs, so P is ultimately exposed to C via R. 
While P should be relatively more robust than in our previous stability
simulations, there is no a priori reason to exclude its demise by C; nor can
we preclude P Û R drift eliminating P in the absence of realized cheater
mutations.  Table 9 presents one sample 500,000 year run under the heuristic
for each of the parameter combinations .2,.8 forager death, 200, 900
replacement fitness, viscous dispersal, for both initial all P and all R
populations.  P is stable with 200 replacement fitness; R not (Table 9); R was
stable with cheater-only mutation (Table 7).  Predominately P locales are less
vulnerable to self-derived mutants than R locales, shifting the population to
P.  But this is true only so long as C has a foothold in R clusters.  Over
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long sequences this may not occur, leading to high f R by drift, then decay
once C invades.  While P is 500,000-year stable at {200, .2, v}, with f P > .9
about 80% of the time, it dips as low as 10% of the population (Table 9); P's
relative stability against R is probabilistic, with pathways of elimination
clearly possible.
Table 10 measures probable P loss for 200 replacement fitness under
various forager deaths by repeating runs of .2, .5., .8 forager death 100
times each.  As forager death increases P becomes more resistant to loss
through R drift.  R "incubates" more cheaters, focused on its own type through
viscosity, with increasing forager death, curtailing P elimination by drift;
so average maximal f R decreases with increasing forager death.  When lost, P
is readily regained through R Þ P mutation, drift, and resistance (via
punishment) to cheaters, ultimately preponderant in frequency again.  For
sufficiently high forager death, however, P's loss leads to f Q = 1 (.8; Table
10).  Without backmutation from cheating to coordination, P's loss is here
irrecoverable.  At high forager death R is quickly eliminated by "its" mutant
C, so P's loss through R drift is curtailed; but the frequency of P encounter
of large C clusters is also enhanced, leading to occasional stochastic
elimination of P.  Paradoxically, P's continuous presence is related inversely
to probable population-wide loss of coordination; P's occasional loss to
drifting R enhances P's long term persistence.
We would expect, then, Q saturation more likely under R stability runs,
as the population is initially all R.  Under the mutation heuristic an all R
stating population shifts to all Q about 3.6 times as often as an initial all
P population (43 vs 12, with .8 forager death; Tables 10,11).  R is always
lost over simulated forager deaths ([.2,.8]), with P predominant over all
(Table 11).  While the mutation heuristic favors P over R ( P Þ R @ .0001; R
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Þ P @ .001), shifting mutation in favor of R would simply enhance the
probability of Q saturation at high forager death under viscosity.
6.  Random assortment shifts the population between R and P at
"moderate" forager death, although P remains mildly resistance to complete
loss; at high forager death, population-wide loss of coordination is very
likely.
Table 12 duplicates Table 10 ( P stability) with random assortment. 
Populations shift between prevalent P,R under forager deaths in [.2,.5], but P
remains mildly resistant to complete loss (in 14 of 100  500,000 year runs);
when lost P often re-emerges through R Þ P mutation, readily recovering 
population dominance (Table 12).   When P is preponderant, rare mutant C,Q are
likely eliminated when phenotypically expressed (at 200 replacement fitness),
leaving little room for R increase beyond drift; preponderant R is kinder to
Q, as well as to P in PR[Q/C] groups (themselves more frequent under random
assortment).  High frequency P is thus less inclined to downward drift than
high frequency R, so P remains slightly resistant to loss even under random
assortment (Table 10 vs 12);  the bias is, of course, amplified under
viscosity, where R clusters encounter cheaters at a higher rate than P
clusters.
The low replacement fitness (200) used for Table 12 makes group success
(brood raiding success) unlikely when combined R,P predominate; the personal
advantage of realized replacement is difficult to detect in our 100 adult
colony population, even under random assortment ( cf the parallel "fair
contest" results in Table 5).  P's loss at [.2,.5] forager death does not
jeopardize the persistence of coordination ( P or R) in the population; at the
R Þ P mutation level .001 used herein, P is regained before R too is lost
stochastically.  Recall that the adult population is not replaced yearly; on
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average, (about) 5 adult colonies die per year, leaving little yearly
opportunity for successful replacement.  In simulations (deferred here) with
high adult colony death (over 50% per year), coordination is indeed lost under
random assortment where retained here.
Yet, without the protection against cheaters provided by viscosity
(interaction restricted to "cluster boundaries" and "self-damaging" clustered
cheater interaction), P (so too R) is unable to resist elimination by cheaters
at high forager death (.8):  f Q = 1 in 93 of 100 trials (in 6 of the remaining
7 cases, P is never lost during the 500,000 years; Table 12); under viscosity
f Q = 1 in 12 of 100 trials under otherwise identical conditions (Table 10). 
Clearly an all R starting population would induce, if anything, greater loss
of population-wide coordination ( cf Tables 10, 11).  Cheaters, incubated
population-wide at a high rate (due to high forager death) by R's, cannot be
"driven back" through punishing P's.  As we shall see, P may invade and
eliminate Q under {200, .8, r} (Table 14, below); but, without constant
backmutation from cheating to coordination ( Q Þ P), the stochastic
elimination of P through recurrent high frequency Q is quite likely.
7.  Under the heuristic with P Û R mutation, random assortment induces
the population-wide loss of coordination more than viscosity ; when not, P
predominates.
Table 13 expands the space of simulated  replacement fitnesses (200,
400, 600, 900), testing only for the population-wide loss of coordination
(populations of all first-stage cheaters) under viscosity and random
assortment (100 trials per parameter set of 500,000 years each).  For low (.2)
forager death, coordination is retained under both forms of dispersal from 200
to 600 replacement fitnesses; P predominates, albeit with less variability
under viscosity ( cf, e.g., Tables 11, 12 for 200 replacement fitness). 
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Viscosity is not necessary for evolutionarily persistent (in contrast to
continuously present) P as measured herein ( cf Table 12).  A greater
opportunity for realized replacement can be tolerated for sufficiently low
forager death for replacing R, as simultaneously surviving R dilutes the
cheater's impact on population frequencies.
With greater forager death viscosity provides unique stability for
coordination ({200, .8, v}, {400, [.5,.8], v}; Table 13).  Stability appears
not as uniformly high P vs R (or vice versa) but as usually high combined P,R,
biased toward P overall; as we shall see, this bias will become greater when
we allow backmutation from cheating to coordination (Table 14).  Note that,
without P, coordination as R would be lost under high forager death, even with
low replacement fitness (Tables 7, 13 and above).  We stress that replacement
is personally advantageous under all simulated parameter sets; yet it is
clearly inferior to P as a first stage game coordination strategy (we focus on
replacing C shortly).  Nor does R require a "kin fitness component" (via
viscosity) to be evolutionarily successful (after, e.g., Maynard Smith 1964).
 In the "fair contests", R does worse under viscosity (Tables 3-6).  Rather,
under the heuristic, R persists through mutation from P and drift when P,R are
phenotypically identical where it would otherwise be eliminated.
8.  Under the heuristic, replacement is stable solely through the
cheater morph C.
Coordination loss overall follows the same trajectory under both
viscosity and random assortment.  P is fairly resistant to its "self-induced"
mutant Q under the heuristic, much less to C (Tables 3-6, 8).  High
frequencies of R, due to drift, allow greater mutation to C, causing
significant dips in the frequency of R.  As C increases in frequency it
encounters Q through mutation on C or P.  Whether P survives depends on its
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resistance to C and C's resistance to Q, as P can usually push back high
frequencies of Q under many parameter sets.  Under random mixing P,R decrease
together against C ( R more rapidly than P partly because of PRC groups). 
Under viscosity P's frequency remains relatively unchanged until the C invaded
R patch is eliminated; P then struggles against C until the latter is
eliminated, if possible, from within by Q; P then pushes back Q.  This P ® R
® C ® Q ® P cycle repeats until, with parameter dependent probability, both
P,R are eliminated; cycles are brief under random assortment, more prolonged
under viscosity.
At high forager death coordination loss invariably yields predominately
Q populations, irrespective of viscosity (e.g., Tables 10-12; cf Tables 3-6
"fair contest" results).  Since C replaces a cheating groupmate ( C,Q assigned
but refusing the foraging role), evolutionarily persistent C should imply some
Q in polymorphism.  This is true of random assortment, but not necessarily of
viscosity; viscosity depresses Q's frequency by augmenting self-play, limiting
its frequency dependent fitness ( cf Grafen 1979; Pollock 1989a, 1996).  Under
random assortment C,Q are polymorphic at 900 replacement fitness, .5 forager
death; under viscosity the population is essentially all C, save sporadic Q
via mutation ( cf Tables 4,6).
P's reliance on Q to eliminate C accounts for the only anomaly in Table
13.  At {600, .5, v} coordination is lost in all 100 trials, but in only 68 of
100 trials at {600, .8, v}.  At .5 forager death the population stabilizes as
essentially all C.  At .8 forager death Q's performance against C increases,
leading to the latter's elimination sometimes before the elimination of  P;
when so, P may recover predominance.  Note that coordination is lost
essentially identically at {600, .5, r} and {600, .8, r}, as Q's success is
not suppressed by local self-assortment (Table 13).  Paradoxically, under
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viscosity, high forager death can augment P's persistence by eliminating C in
favor of Q, while moderate forager death eliminates P by favoring C over Q.
 Table 13 suggests P's recovery in predominately Q populations is
contingent on viscosity.  While sensible, in that punishment aids P's in other
local groups while Q self-assorts detrimentally under viscosity, we conclude
by showing this only weakly true.  By allowing backmutation from cheaters
( Q,C) to coordination ( P,R), we find coordination often replaces cheating
under both forms of dispersal.
9.  Adding backmutation from cheating to coordination to the heuristic,
population-wide coordination is usually recovered when its loss leads to a
predominately Q population under either viscosity or random assortment;
viscosity simply reduces the frequency of loss and speeds recovery.  Recovery
from predominately C populations is possible, but usually only under low
replacement fitness.
Table 14 duplicates Table 13 with Q Þ P and C Þ R mutation @ .0001;
conforming to the heuristic (above), we preclude the other two backmutation
paths as orders of magnitude less likely.  As in Table 13, the proportion of
100 trials per parameter set in which coordination is lost throughout the
population is given, now followed by the probability of  recovered
coordination through backmutation.  Recovery is defined as at least 15% P,R
combined morphs at year 500,000 after complete loss; almost always recovery
entails 100% P some point after recovery.  With two exceptions backmutation
does not alter the probability of coordination loss (Tables 13, 14).  At {600,
.8, v} probability of loss declines from .68 without to .55 with backmutation.
 As P backmutates only from Q, this likely reflects an "early start" in P's
elimination of Q patches by appearing within these patches; Q pushes C back
while P attacks Q from within ( cf point 8 above).  The other exception is
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{400, .5, v} where loss decreases from .14 to .07.  Its significance is
unclear.  It may reflect the precariousness of C victories under low
replacement fitness, with backmutation opening other "fronts" against C; or C
may be prone to higher variance in victory precisely because it is weak, with
backmutation playing no real role.
Once coordination is lost, the best predictor of recovery is whether Q
predominates in the uncoordinated state.  P usually recovers (e.g., 534 of 576
runs [92.7%] at .8 forager death, combined across replacement fitnesses and
dispersal; Table 14) via backmutation in mostly Q populations.  Under random
assortment the population jumps from all P to all Q and back, with brief high
frequencies of C during P's (re-)demise.  Most backmutant P's are eliminated
through drift when phenotypically identical with Q (as neither replaces);
foraging P, when rare, tends to eliminate itself through high forager
mortality.  Occasionally, however,  P drifts to higher frequency through
repeated placement in non-foraging roles.  P begins to encounter itself within
groups; when foraging aids a clone the 1000:1 group fitness differential
boosts P's representation in the next population of adult colonies.  Repeated
"boost opportunities" ultimately increase P's frequency sufficiently to
eliminate Q in a more deterministic fashion.  Viscosity slows P's loss and
speeds its recovery, clumping both P and Q irrespective of population
frequencies (above).
Cheating i s resistant to backmutation only within preponderantly C
populations.  In all cases where coordination fails to re-emerge, C
predominates in the all cheater population (all parameter sets with .06 or
less recovery in Table 14).  Here R has already been destroyed by its "self-
derived" mutant C; that only R backmutates from C gives coordination little
scope for recovery.
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Preponderantly C populations permit coordination recovery in two cases,
both under viscosity ({400,.5, v}; {600, .2, v}; Table 14).  In both,
coordination is lost only 7% of the time, suggesting C's success is mostly
stochastic.  Inspection of these simulations shows that, although C
predominates under coordination loss, up to 30% of the population may become
one or more Q patch( es).  Such patches husband backmutated P which, once
sufficiently frequent, seem able to resist C under viscosity and low/moderate
replacement fitness/forager death ( cf Table 8 for similar resistance by P). 
Random assortment confirms this logic in one case:  coordination loss is an
order of magnitude higher, with recovery less frequent in {400,.5, r} relative
to {400, .5, v} (Table 14), suggesting backmutating P benefits from Q clumps
in the latter.  {600, .2, v} and {600, .2, r} are, however, nearly identical
in loss/recovery, with coordination rarely lost in either case.
Table 14 provides the only clear instance where viscosity harms
coordination.  Under both {900, .5, v}, {900, .5, r} coordination is almost
always lost.  Under random assortment coordination (as P) is always regained;
under viscosity almost never (3 of 100 opportunities).  Under random
assortment C,Q co-exist in about equal proportions, providing ample
opportunity for P recovery through backmutation as outlined above.  Under
viscosity C predominates, as Q harms itself through self-clumping; 900
replacement fitness seems to preclude the (stochastic) Q clumps which permit P
recovery under {400,.5, v}, where replacer C is less group efficient.
Conclusion
Mistakes and efficient coordination
There is  remarkably little evidence supporting the intuition that
personally advantageous replacement is evolutionarily viable among non-
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cheating morphs.  Only when the cheating variant of R, C,  is precluded do
simulations support the intuition of personal advantage, and then only under
high replacement fitness, low/moderate forager death, and random assortment
({900, (0, .5], r}; "fair contests" of Table 4).  But to preclude C is
capricious.  C is a mutant of R in the same way Q is a mutant of P.  There is,
moreover, no reason why cheating and replacement cannot be properties of the
same strategy; indeed, an evolutionary "war of attrition" on waiting times for
replacement (after Parker 1970; Bishop and Cannings 1978; Parker and Thompson
1980; Maynard Smith 1982; discussed further below) essentially combines
cheating and replacement (positive but finite waiting time) in the same
individual.
Strategies always perform correctly in the simulations, responding to
their social environment without error.  Successful replacement (a group with
a phenotypic replacer surviving to adulthood) thus necessarily augments the
fitness of the cheater ( C or Q) forcing replacement, depressing R's relative
advantage.  Deviation from coordination need not, however, be strategic.  A
P,R assigned the forager role might mistakenly "believe" otherwise (after
Sugden 1985; Boyd 1989); such a purely phenotypic effect would provide an
advantage to replacing R without affecting the future frequency of encountered
genotypic cheaters.
We have exc luded this possibility for two reasons.  A coordination
mechanism must, by definition, be unambiguous, for ambiguity is open to
exploitation ( Aumann 1974; Myerson 1986; 1991:244-258; Fudenberg and Triole
1991:53-59).  Acromyrmex versicolor seems to exhibit such a mechanism; there
is usually only one surface excavator and, when there are two (in laboratory 3
foundress colonies) only one (the future forager) goes to the surface once
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excavation is well underway. 9  A "coordination mistake" is then tantamount to
cheating, as it requires a female to "not know" she goes to the surface.
There is, furthermore, another kind of mistake, detrimental to R, which
seems much more plausible.  A replacer must "decide" coordination failure
(mistake or genotypic cheating) has occurred.  The only clear indicator of
failure is a torpid fungus garden in the presence of an ostensive assigned
forager.  A garden, however, may be torpid not because of coordination
failure, but because the assigned forager has had a run of bad luck.  That
these desert ant foundresses place their nests directly under the canopy of
the tree whose leaves they harvest suggests sensitivity to resource
variability ( Rissing et al. 1986); they prefer this location even though there
is a high probability that an adult colony "owner" will eliminate them.  In a
temporally variable desert habitat temporary foraging failure must be common.
Why, then, have a specialized forager at all?  We have already noted how
experience improves individual foraging efficiency.  But colony foraging
efficiency would similarly improve with the number of foragers.  Recall,
however, that we believe foundresses form associations to enhance their
colony's later success at brood raiding by augmenting initial worker (raider)
number ( Rissing and Pollock 1987, 1991; Pollock and Rissing 1989, 1995;
Rissing et al. 1989).   A relatively inexperienced foundress is more
vulnerable to surface predation.  Distributing foraging effort over
cofoundresses with variable experience can then be  less efficient for colony
survival if worker production is curtailed through death of the inexperienced.
 Similarly, hymenopteran workers must often accept coordination tasks which
                    
  9The empirical correlation between surface excavator and forager is imperfect partly because two
ndresses sometime surface excavate ( Rissing et al. 1996).  It increases if one looks only at the
 sequence of excavation.  Assignment failure happens mostly when the predominate surface excavator
r the end of surface excavation is not the predominate surface excavator overall (which we define
the "true" excavator).  In those cases with two excavators, the third foundress never assumed the
aging task.
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are inefficient at the moment because coordination is efficient for the colony
over the distribution of coordinated tasks ( xx include Rissing book chapter).
A short-run decision to replace (or aid) an unsuccessful foundress may
be costly for long term survival.  While our simulations assume coordination
is never mis-identified, they also assume replacers never incorrectly infer
the presence of a cheater.  Variable short term foraging failure in a desert
habitat suggests that mistaken replacement should be much more common than
"mis-read" task assignment.  Indeed, the evolution of task coordination may be
little more than the progressive elimination of mistaken replacement.
The emergence of foraging specialization
Briefly, we envision the following scenario for the evolution of A.
versicolor foraging specialization.  Tropical fungus garden ant foundresses
are often solitary and claustral ( Hölldobler and Wilson 1990), feeding their
fungus pellet from their own biotic reserves (eggs) and environmentally
plentiful moisture.  Even when group living, fungus garden cofoundresses are
usually claustral (e.g., Mintzer and Vinson 1985) or facultatively so ( Diehl-
Fleig and de Araújo 1996).  Acromyrmex versicolor lives at the xeric extreme
of known fungus garden ants.  We suggest lack of near surface moisture forces
foundresses to forage, initially more for moisture (within fresh leaves) for
the fungus than anything else; the fungus may later become dependent on early
leaf nutrients once foundress foraging is established.
Once foraging foundresses begin to form associations to enhance victory
in inter-colony brood wars, the efficiency trade- offs we have sketched shape
task assignment ( cf, e.g., Page and Kim Fondrk 1995 for an empirical analysis
of inter-colony selection and foraging efficiency, involving indirect
[passive] intergroup competition [ Pollock and Rissing 1995], in the honeybee
Apis mellifera).  As noted earlier, a surface excavator can arise solely
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through selection for excavation efficiency to limit near surface predation at
nest foundation ( Rissing and Pollock 1986; Pollock and Rissing 1995).  This
slight asymmetry in surface experience can then be amplified through a
progressively greater reluctance for non-surface excavators to abandon the
fungus even when it appears torpid, so long as the surface excavator lives
with them (see, e.g., Wilson 1985 for similar coordination, over brood care,
in the ant Pheidole pubiventris; Rissing 1984 for task replacement upon
removal of current practitioners in the ant Myrmecocystus mexicanus). 
Acromyrmex versicolor workers are capable of task coordination for long term
efficiency; cofoundresses simply activate the coordination potential prevalent
among their workers.  Punishment (greater reluctance to refuse task assignment
among coordinated non-foragers) becomes a by-product of usually successful
long term coordination.
Rather than biasing simulations in favor of P, our exclusion of mistakes
more likely harms P.  Population-wide loss of coordination occurs because R
drifts to high frequency, with mutant C then eliminating both R,P either
"deterministically" (e.g., {900,.2, r}; Tables 13,14) or stochastically (e.g.,
{200, .8, v}; Tables 13, 14).  A "mistaken replacement" cost to R should
depress such outcomes, especially under viscosity, as R drift is now subject
to a constant downward pressure; C, as a possible replacer, should also be
subject to this cost, albeit perhaps not as severely, as true cheating occurs
among clumped, viscous C much of the time.  Both processes eliminating P are
thus weaker under the most likely mistakes.
Stable C?
Under the heuristic with backmutation P is evolutionarily persistent
even when lost, continually re-invading the population to at least temporary
fixation, except when the all cheater population is predominately C (Table
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14).  This may be an artifact of our analysis.  We have truncated foundress
social ecology to a two stage game; at the second stage selection of a
replacer when two are present ( RR, CC, RC) is random, without contention. 
Consider, however, a "hesitant C, ( H) who waits a little longer than C to
replace, hoping that her non-foraging partner is C rather than P,Q.  Group
fitness of a replacing H will be less than that of a replacing C but, with
sufficient encounter of first replacing C, small delay times should insure  H
some share of the population; this is just an evolutionarily war of attrition
in waiting times sensu Maynard Smith (1982).
Under viscosity an H invading a C cluster may do quite well, eliminating
C just as C eliminates R where, under random assortment, both ( R,C; C,H)
should persist in polymorphism.  But Q could not invade C because of the
latter's relative high replacement fitness (Tables 3, 4, 13, 14); H has a
lower replacement fitness, so might be invadable by Q.  If not, an H* having 
a slightly longer waiting time may invade H just as the latter invaded C. 
Repetition of such invading, incrementally longer waiting times will
ultimately permit Q invasion; P can then re-invade as discussed earlier. 
Under viscosity, a simple extension of our game suggests coordination and
punishment will always be persistent as defined herein even though
coordination may be periodically lost ( cf Pollock 1989b, 1995b for further
discussion of the cyclic loss, re-invasion of cooperative [group efficient]
strategies).  Random assortment, in contrast, will yield a stable variation in
replacement times ( Maynard Smith 1982).  While simulations indicate only a
mild persistence advantage for P under viscosity ( P not lost as frequently),
viscosity's ability to eliminate frequency dependent fitness states  (e.g.,
Table 4 vs 6) may shape a unique, synchronous, uniform potential for
punishment over much of a population's evolutionary history ( cf Wilson 1990).
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We did not model first stage game assignment of forager as a war of
attrition in continuous waiting times because of the empirical correlation
between surface excavator and forager ( Rissing et al. 1996).  One could treat
the first-stage game as an asymmetric war of attrition, with waiting times
biased by excavation role ( Hammerstein 1981; Maynard Smith 1982); indeed, for
any imperfect empirical correlation, sufficient weight to surface excavation
will conform to data.  But this is just another coordination mechanism, still
based on prior surface role ( Aumann 1974; Rosenthal 1974; Myerson 1986).  It
is less group efficient, so less plausible under empirically likely viscosity
(see above) and, at present, superfluous.  Our simulations herein focus on
cheating after assignment, requiring only that some female be uniquely
assigned as forager in a public manner, as is always, empirically, the case
( Rissing et al. 1989, 1996).
Personally best response vs evolutionary predominance
Analyses of evolutionary stability are often handicapped by the
existence of distinct strategies which are usually phenotypically identical
(e.g., Maynard Smith 1982; Boyd and Lorberbaum 1987; Brown and Vincent 1987;
Boyd 1989; Farrell and Ware 1989; Pollock 1989b; Swinkels 1992a,b; Samuelson
1997).  Even when third strategies appear via mutation or phenotypic variance
("mistakes") which differentiate otherwise identical strategies, drift among
the latter may ultimately shift population states ( cf Kandori et al. 1993,
Binmore et al. 1995 for shifts even when strategies are usually not
phenotypically identical).  Our mutation heuristic generates the population
cycle
(all) P ® (some to all)  R ® (mostly)  C ® (mostly or all) Q ® (all) P
under both viscosity and random dispersal.  In our simulations the locus of
evolutionary stability is not a single population state of strategies, but a
cycle of population states where mutants invading any given state are defined
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by the prior strategies of that state (Darwin 1859; Brockmann and Dawkins
1979; Dawkins 1980; Pollock 1989b, 1995b).  A strategy is evolutionarily
predominate if its temporal duration at high frequency, averaged across all
states of the cycle, is greater than that of  any other strategy within the
cycle (after Kandori et al. 1993; Binmore et al. 1995).  It may well be that
such predominance requires the strategy to be lost in one cycle state.
Strategies which are personally best responses to deviations by others
(as R is relative to P when encountering rare C,Q; after Selten 1975; Boyd and
Lorberbaum 1987; Farrell and Ware 1989) may be poor candidates for
evolutionary predominance when the personally best response aids the deviator
more than self, as a replacer aids her cheater.  When so, the population can
shift to a frequency dependent mixture of these strategies (e.g., R, Q or C,
Q) which then shifts the population elsewhere upon introduction of a then
admissible mutant.  E.g., C is a personally best response to itself (a
phenotypic cheating, C) relative to P; but, as we have seen, victorious C may
be invaded by Q, which is then re-invaded by P.
Inter-group competition, mutation rates, and viscosity
The temporal duration of a strategy within an cycle depends on the
frequency as well as kind of mutation.  Our simulations employ high mutation
rates for clear results (.001, .0001).  The last phase of the cycle,
(mostly or all) Q ® (all) P,
relies on Q,P drift under non-foraging task assignment, especially at .8
forager death under random assortment (see discussion in results).  Such drift
will often fail (as rare forager P is usually killed at .8 forager death),
requiring recurrent Q Þ P backmutation to renew the cycle; our backmutation
rate of .0001 may here over-estimate coordination recovery.
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Results under viscosity should be less sensitive to mutation rate.  Once
a P survives the brood raiding transition into an adult colony (either by
drift and/or surviving forager predation) her foundress descendants are
clumped among neighboring trees.  While success is still partly stochastic,
requiring the death of a neighboring adult colony and survival of P's own,
expectations are now in her favor (one of two neighboring colonies is more
likely to die before her own); clumping then provides a "deterministic"
advantage for her descendants, relative to random assortment, a local "founder
effect" sensu Cohen and Eshel 1976.  Similarly, size of the adult colony
population need have no effect on viscous clumping (e.g., enlarging the circle
in our model) but reduces chance encounter of P's under random assortment. 
Biologically more realistic mutation rates will likely cause greater temporal
duration in the non-coordinated population state under random assortment
relative to viscosity, with viscosity and observed coordination thereby
correlated in nature.
Our model of viscosity is more extreme than that of Acromyrmex
versicolor, where around 6 colonies likely contribute sexuals to a local
mating aggregation ( Rissing, estimate from field observation).  Moreover, some
foundresses undoubtedly disperse sufficiently from their mating aggregation to
encounter those mated in other aggregations.  Our conclusions must be
qualitative.  While viscosity seems a plausible process affecting the duration
of coordination, the cost of cheating, expressed as relative brood raiding
ability (inter-group competition), is also important.  As replacement fitness
(brood raiding ability) decreases, C (via drifting R) is less a threat to P,
irrespective of dispersal (200-400 replacement fitness, .2-.5 forager death;
Table 13); mutant C's probable survival to colony maturity decreases, leaving
P less exposed to future C's (via output from an adult colony) per C mutation.
 Inter-group competition has no affect on the Q ® P phase of the cycle, as no
47
replacement occurs; but low replacement fitness (non-linear effect of foraging
delay on brood raiding success) increases waiting time for P ® C transition,
increasing observable coordination.
Both coordination loss and gain are contingent on mutation opportunities
which, of course, vary with simulation length.  As noted previously, our use
of 500,000 years exceeds the total age of A. versicolor's desert habitat.  We
do not find this limiting in a first analysis, as reducing simulation time
will reduce net first loss of coordination, favoring our bias that
coordination with personally disadvantageous punishment exists in A.
versicolor.  Our qualitative results without backmutation (Table 13) would
survive time spans conforming with ecological history, but the ubiquitous
retrieval of all P populations (over many parameter values; Table 14) would be
less evident.  This highlights, we think, a general quandary in the
application of infinite time frame analyses to behavioral ecology ( cf
Samuelsan 1997).  Not only may a population fail to be at " evolutionarily
equilibrium" due to youth (e.g., the North American population of the imported
fire ant, Solenopsis invicta; e.g., Ross 19xx); a population may be cycling
across states in a predictable manner, but beyond the purview of the field
ecologist.
Finally, we note one limitation of our simulations suggested by
empirically likely viscosity.  Simulations do not permit "empty" locations in
any year; under viscosity, three  contiguous adult colonies cannot die
simultaneously.  Such gaps are, however, a predictable outcome of viscous
dispersal in some circumstances (e.g., Harada et al. 1995).  It is not true,
for example, that adult colony death is independent of colony age.  Under
viscosity patches of colonies of about the same age may appear, dying as a
cohort; viscous re-invasion from the margins would again produce a patch of
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colonies of about the same age.  There is cursory evidence for this in the
desert seed-harvester ant Messor (Veromessor) pergandei, which exhibits the
same viscous dispersal, clumped starting colonies, adult territoriality
complex as A. versicolor ( M. pergandei is claustral; refs above).  At one
locale (near Boulder City, Colorado, USA), xx adult colonies, present for 4+
years, died with in 8 years of one another ( Rissing, pers. obs.); as with A.
versicolor, an expected M. pergandei colony life span of 15-20 years is not
unreasonable.  Such fine tuning of models to species life history may be
important:  in our current model, a colony longevity of about 2 (not 20) years
causes coordination loss under (200, .8, v) in all 100 trials within 100,000
years (contrast 12 of 100 trials of 500,000 years in Table 13); analysis of
such results are deferred for elsewhere.  One empirically plausible solution
to possible local population extinction is a meta-population of intersecting
circumferences, with each circumference a viscous dispersal path; colonies at
intersections may travel either path.  Local extinction and re-invasion would
be endogenous, permitting locally correlated adult colony death beyond the
scope of our present effort.
Summary of simulation results
Strategies are defined in Table 2.  P (" punisher") and  R (" replacer")
are first stage game coordinators, accepting the foraging task when so
assigned.  C,Q are first stage game "cheaters", refusing initial foraging
assignment.  R,C will replace a first stage game cheater; P,Q will not (so Q
never forages).  While C will replace a cheater, a cheating C will not replace
herself.  There are four mutation regimes: two "cheater only" regimes, P,R Þ
Q and P,R Þ C,Q (C Û  Q); a "mutation heuristic" with strategy properties
defining mutation paths, P Þ Q; R Þ C; P Û R;
C Û Q; and the mutation heuristic expanded to include the backmutation
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pathways Q Þ P;
C Þ R.  Cheating depresses group competitive ability (among clumped natal
colonies), but less so when the cheater is replaced;  a group with a
phenotypic replacer has a replacement fitness, variable by simulation.  Group
fitnesses are ordered as  Coordination > Replaced Cheater > No Forager. 
Foragers are subject to variable (by simulation) predation risk.  Dispersal is
either viscous, with foundresses aggregating at nearest neighboring trees
(from their parental colony/tree location); or random, with foundresses
forming a population wide pool.  In the case of viscosity, trees are ordered
on a circle.  Further simulation details in text.
A fair contest begins with a population 1/2 all P, 1/2 all R groups,
with same type groups contiguous under viscosity; mutation regimes here yield
only cheaters; "wins", entailing the elimination of the rival coordinator, are
defined in the text.  Stability results usually begin with an all P
population, except under cheater only mutation, where both all P or all R.
Fair contest results:
1.  Under viscosity, P often out performs R; otherwise they "win" equally
(Tables 3,4).
2.  Under random assortment R improves its relative performance to P, but
coordination (combined P,R wins) usually does worse (relative to
viscosity); exceptions are detailed as points 3, 4 below (Tables 5,6).
3.  Random assortment yields unique superiority for R (relative to P) under
high replacement fitness, with a stable polymorphism of R,Q (or C,Q when
C is allowed) under moderate forager death (Table 6).
4.  R wins uniquely (without polymorphic Q) only with no forager risk and high
replacement fitness (under either form of dispersal) (Tables 4,6).
5.  Under viscosity, allowing C mutation shifts wins from P to Q at high
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forager risk ( C almost never wins itself; Tables 3,4).
6.  Under random assortment, C wins at moderate/low forager risk with high
replacement fitness, but never at low replacement fitness (Tables 5,6).
Stability result under cheater only mutation(s):
7.  Under viscosity, P is stable when R is, but not conversely (Tables 7,8).
Stability under the heuristic without backmutation:
8.   P usually predominates over R, irrespective of dispersal.  R may supplant
P via drift, but
P Û R mutation insures P's recovery.  Viscosity depresses the frequency
of predominate
R as forager risk increases (Tables 9-12).
9.  Under low replacement fitness, the population-wide loss of coordination
(simultaneous loss of both P,R) occurs only at high forager risk, under
both viscosity or random assortment; such loss is, however, much more
likely under random assortment than viscosity (93% vs 12%; Table 13).
10.  Overall, viscous populations are never more likely to exhibit total
coordination loss and, for some combination of forager risk and
replacement fitness, much less likely (Table 13).
11.  Under the heuristic, replacement is stable (able to resist P recovery)
solely through the cheater morph C; replacement is stable only when
first stage game coordination is not  (Table 13).
Stability under the heuristic with backmutation:
12.  Allowing backmutation does not generally alter probable population-wide
coordination loss (Table 13 vs 14).
13.  Probable coordination loss is generally not correlated with the
population-wide recovery of  coordination beginning through
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backmutation.  Populations may lose and regain coordination repeatedly
under both forms of dispersal (Tables 13, 14).
13.  When coordination loss yields a predominately Q population, P readily re-
invades and supplants all other strategies under both form of dispersal.
 Evolutionary stability lies not in a single population state, but in
the cycle of population states  (all) P ® (some to all)  R ® (mostly)  C
® (mostly or all) Q ® (all) P, a cycle with phases of drift [e.g.,
(all) P ® (some to all)  R] and "deterministic" selection [e.g., (some
to all)  R ® (mostly)  C].  When this cycle exists under both forms of
dispersal for given replacement fitness and forager risk, time in the
(all) P state is greater under viscosity, and [(some to all)  R ®
(mostly)  C ® (mostly or all) Q ® (all) P] transitions are quicker;
viscosity can enhance P's temporal share of the cycle (see text).
14.  Population-wide recovery of coordination is precluded only when its loss
yields a predominately C population; such a population is more likely
under viscosity because spatial clumping of Q can depress its frequency
where, under random assortment, Q would be (more) polymorphic with C. 
Thus viscosity can harm coordination (for some combinations of 
replacement fitness, forager risk) by preventing the [(mostly)  C ®
(mostly or all) Q]  phase of the cycle (Table 14).
15.  C's success in eliminating P,R suggests a strategy which may in turn
eliminate C even when Q cannot.  This strategy will, however, be more
vulnerable to Q than was C.  Expanding our strategy space through a new
mutation on C may recover the cycle in extended form, ultimately
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The effect of experimentally induced "cheating" on colony development
(from Rising et al. 1996)
Control
mean + SD (N)
Experimental















1.6 + 1.8 (9) 0.2 + 0.6 (10) .05
Fungus garden
mass, mg*
52.2 + 51.8 (8) 2.0 + 3.7 (8) .02




Admissible strategies by two-stage game properties
Strategy Accepts original
foraging assignment









Wins by forager death, colony fitness under replacement 200
 viscous dispersal
forager









































































Mutation regimes:  P,R,C,Q --> C, Q  @ .001  in normal type; P,R --> Q  @ .001
 in italics
*na = "not applicable", as here mutation to C is precluded.
57
Table 4.













































































Mutation regimes:  P,R,C,Q --> C, Q  @ .001  in normal type; P,R --> Q  @ .001
 in italics
*na = "not applicable", as here mutation to C is precluded.
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Table 5
Wins by forager death, colony fitness under replacement 200
 random assortment
forager

















































Mutation regimes:  P,R,C,Q --> C, Q  @ .001  in normal type; P,R --> Q  @ .001
 in italics
*na = "not applicable", as here mutation to C is precluded.
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Table 6.





























































































Mutation regimes:  P,R,C,Q --> C, Q  @ .001  in normal type; P,R --> Q  @ .001
 in italics
*na = "not applicable", as here mutation to C is precluded.
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Table 7
R Stability runs, cheater mutants only






R,C -- > Q,C .001
.2 forager death
f R > .8; f R > .9  99.9%
f C < .2; f Q < .1
f C = 1 around year 7,500
f Q < .2; f Q > .1 .036%
R --> Q .001
.2 forager death
not necessary * f R > .7; f R > .9  99.14%
R,C --> Q,C  .001
.8 forager death
f Q = 1 around year 4,500 not necessary
R --> Q .001
.8 forager death
f Q = 1 around year 4,200 not necessary
*not necessary---i.e., other cell implies current cell is (not) stable.
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Table 8
P Stability runs, cheater mutants only






P,C -- > Q,C .001
.2 forager death
f P > .8; f P > .9  99.92%
f Q < .1
f C > .1  .087%
f C = 1 around year 8,000
P --> Q .001
.2 forager death
not necessary * f P > .9
P,C --> Q,C  .001
.8 forager death




P ® C ® Q ® P
not necessary
P --> Q .001
.8 forager death
f P > .5; f P = 1 @ year
500,000
f Q > .4  .0726%
f P > .9  92.1%
f P > .5; f P = .9967 @
year 500,000
f Q > .4  .013%
*not necessary---i.e., other cell implies current cell is (not) stable.
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Table 9








f P > .1; f P > .9  79.5%
f P < .5  2.36%
f P = 1 @ 500,000
f R < .9; f R > .5  2.35%
f Q , f C  < .1
f C =1 around year 33,000
initially all P
.8 forager death
f P  > .5; f P > .9  84.7%
f P = .997 @ 500,000
f R < .5; f R > .3   0.46%
f Q < .6, f C  < .7
occasional patches of R
yielding R®C®Q®P
cycles




f P = 1 around year
56,000




f R = 0 around year
10,000
f P = 1 around year
42,000
f Q = 1 around year 4,800




P stability runs with mutation heuristic
100 runs of 500,000 years each







fP @ year 500,000










 fQ , fC
.2 .28
f P > .9  20/28
(71.4%)
f P < .5  3/28
(10.7%)
.827;
f R > .9
0.593%
.169;
 f P < .5
5.22%




f P > .9  8/14
(57.1%)
f P < .5  2/14
(14.3%)
.746;
f R > .9
0.239%
.195;
f P < .5
3.80%
f Q = .116
f C = .159
.8
.12
( f Q = 1 in
all cases)
no Q, C Þ P, R
mutation
so f P remains 0
.493;









f Q = .627
f C = .403
*Since the mutation heuristic precludes mutation from cheaters to
coordinators, counts of f P = 0 are meaningless once f Q = 1; the 12 such runs
are excluded in calculating percent years in which f P < .5, but included in
calculating average minimal f P.
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Table 11
R stability runs with mutation heuristic
100 runs of 500,000 years each







fR @ year 500,000  fR > .9
.2 1.00
f R > .9  0/100
f R > .5  6/100
(6%)




f R > .9  0/100
f R > .5  3/100
(3%)





( f Q = 1 in
43/100
cases) *
f R < .2433
f R < .1 96/100
(96%)
[ f P > .9 39/57
cases where f Q <
1,
f P > .68 in other
18/57]
.275%
* without backmutation to coordination ( P,R) from cheating ( Q,C),
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Table 12
P stability runs with mutation heuristic
100 runs of 500,000 years each





fP @ year 500,000







f P > .9  71/86
(82.6%)




f P < .5
9.21%
.5 .86
f P > .9  68/86
(79.1%)








( f Q = 1 in
all cases)
In 1 case where P
lost and regained,
f P = .987; in 6
other cases with









with f Q <
1,
.243;
f P < .5
0.595%
*In two runs, f P > .6, .7.
**The mutation heuristic precludes mutation from cheaters to coordinators;




Probability of population-wide coordination loss after 500,000 years
100 runs









200 0, 0, .12 0, 0, .93
400 0 , .14, .21 0, .80, .99
600 .02, 1, .68 0, .95, .99
900 .98, 1, .91 .96, .99, 1
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Table 14
Probability of population-wide coordination loss after 500,000 years
(probability coordination regained10 after loss in parentheses)
100 runs









200 *, *, .11 (1.0) *, *, .96 (.98)
400 * , .07 (.86), .22 (1.0) *, .77 (.30), .98 (.86)
600 .07 (1.0), 1.0 (.06),
.55 (1.0)
.02 (1.0), .95 (0.0),
.99 (.79)
900 1.0 (.01), 1.0 (.03),
.95 (.99)
.97 (0.0), .99 (1.0),
1.0 (.96)
With Q ÞÞ  P and C ÞÞ  R backmutation of .0001
* = not done as coordination always present without backmutation
                    
  10Measured as 15% or more P,R combined morphs at year 500,000; coordination recovery at year
,000 usually has f P > .90.
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